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REFLECTIONS ON THE RELIGIONLESS SOCIETY:
THE CASE OF ALBANIA

By Denis R. Janz

Denis R. Janz is professor of religious studies at Loyola University, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
·

From the time of its inception as a discipline, the scientific study of religion has raised
the question of the universality of religion. Are human beings somehow naturally religious?
Has there ever been a truly religionless society?

Is modernity itself inimical to religion,

leading slowly but nevertheless inexorably to its extinction? Or does a fundamental human
religiosity survive and mutate into ever new forms, as it adapts itself to the exigencies of the
age? There are as of yet no clear answers to these questions. And religiologists continue to
search for the irreligious society, or at least for the society in which religion is utterly devoid
of any social significance, where the religious sector is a tiny minority made up largely of
elderly people and assorted marginal figures. Some today put forward Iceland as the best
example, on the basis that only 2% attend church (Tomasson, 1980; Swatos, 1984). Others,
basing themselves on International Social Survey Program results from 1991, suggest that the
former East Germany, the Netherlands, and Slovenia are the most secular countries (Greeley,
1993: 52). However we interpret such results, the question remains: has the time come for
us to begin to speak of "the religionless society"?
In the context of questions such as this, the case of Albania is of extraordinary interest.
It was the first and only country to criminalize all religious practice and to officially
proclaim itself an atheist state in 1967. Though no surveys have been done, there are strong
indications that by the end of Albania's communist era in 1991, the death of religion had
indeed occurred here. And it may well be that today religion in Albania remains the weakest
of all. This essay surveys the important factors that contributed to this radical secularization,
all of which were unique to Albania: the "hyper-Stalinism" of Enver Hoxha, the most extreme
policy of isolationism in Eastern Europe, and perhaps the harshest repressive measures
against religion in the world. It then inquires into the religious situation of post-communist
Albania and into the relevance of this for theoretical considerations.

Enver Hoxha

Until it was pulled down in 1991, the stature of Joseph Stalin was the focal point of
Tirana's main city square. Here, in 1953, First Secretary Enver Hoxha knelt and wept when
he heard of Stalin's death and vowed undying loyalty to his memory (Sinishta, 1976: 24).
It was not an empty gesture. From the time when he became the leader of the Albanian
communist party in 1941, through liberation in 1944, to his death in 1985, Hoxha was utterly
convinced that Stalin alone could lead humanity to a brighter future: And since Hoxha was,
from 1944 to 1985 the sole, undisputed leader of Albania, the entire life of this nation was
built on the principles and personal example of Stalin (Schnytzer, 1982; Pipa, 1987-88).
By the mid-sixties Hoxha seems to have wearied of the mundane day-to-day business of
governing. After two decades of haranguing workers to meet production quotas, he now
envisioned a more exalted role for himself on the world-historical stage. Consequently, he
began to commit his thoughts to paper, and the result is the multiple volume set of his
collected writings, translated into several languages. Signs of megalomania are not absent:
Hoxha clearly envisioned himself as a world leader.

But his lifeless prose and endless

repetition of Stalinist dogma is enough to daunt even the most avid researcher. Nevertheless
we must dip into these volumes if we are to understand Hoxha's inspiration.
The first of Hoxha's

oeuvre

worthy of our attention is his 1967 Report on the Role and

Tasks of the Democratic Front for the Complete Triumph of Socialism in Albania (Hoxha,
1974). When he comes in this work to the subject of religion, Hoxha repeats in an almost
perfunctory way the standard Marxist objections. In summary, Hoxha says, "the religious
world outlook and the communist world outlook are irreconcilable. . . . they express and
uphold interests of antagonistic classes" (quoted in Prifti, 1975: 393). But there is a second
reason why religion must be eliminated, and here Hoxha is more emphatic. Religion stands
in the way of modernization. In Albania backward customs and oppressive prejudices block
social and economic development.

And these, Hoxha argues, have a religious basis.

Uprooting these foundations would be a gigantic step in the march toward modernity (Hoxha,
1974: 34, 69). Most important of all though, is the third reason Hoxha gives in this book for
struggling against religion. Throughout their history, the Albanian people have had religion
imposed on them from outside.

That is why, Hoxha says, the clergy have always "made

common cause with the invader" (Hoxha, 1974: 26). The "revolution" which he calls for is
not primarily a struggle between different classes in Albanian society. Rather for Hoxha it
means "to uproot alien customs, traditions and influences, religious superstitions" (Hoxha,
1974: 51), etc. Since religion stands on the side of the foreign-oppressor ,-the revolution must
necessarily attack it. Here xenophobia is added to megalomania.
That same year, 1967, Hoxha wrote another work in which he thoroughly ventilated one
of the "backward customs" for which religion was responsible, namely the appalling treatment
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of women in traditional Albanian society (Hoxha and Alia, 1967). Women's place in this
society is summed up in an old Albanian proverb: "A woman must work harder than a
donkey for the latter feeds on grass while a woman lives on bread" (Hoxha and Alia, 1967:
25).

Such a degrading view is directly due to the influence of Christianity and Islam,

according to Hoxha.

Citing the fiercely misogynist John Chrysostom and the somewhat

milder Thomas Aquinas, Hoxha argued that sexism is deeply embedded in the Christian
tradition (Hoxha and Alia, 1967: 10).

He acknowledged that it was the ""Kanun of Lek

Dukagjin"--the ancient Albanian code of tribal law--which allowed husbands to beat their
wives and demanded that women kneel in reverence before their husbands.

But the

churches, Roman Catholic and Orthodox, advocated the continuation of this legal system
(Hoxha and Alia, 1967: 15). Religion thus sanctions and legitimizes primitive customs that
demeans women and stand in the way of progress. If modernization is to take place religion
must be pushed aside.
One of Hoxha's most revealing literary efforts is his 1979 panegyric to his mentor,
entitled With Stalin (Hoxha, 1979). Here, long after Stalin's other disciples had abandoned
him, Hoxha ardently defend him against all those "slanderers" who now dare to call him a
"bloody tyrant" and a "murderer" (Hoxha, 1979: 14).

This "brilliant mind and pure soul"

(Hoxha, 1979: 16) was "just and a man of principle" (Hoxha, 1979: 36). While all others have
betrayed his memory, Hoxha says, "I bow in devotion to Joseph Stalin" (Hoxha, 1979: 41).
The book goes on to give a full account of Hoxha's five personal meetings with Stalin.
What is striking throughout is Hoxha's groveling for approval, his servile flattery, his
obsequious fawning in the presence of one whom he believed to be a hero of world-historical
dimensions. Especially interesting is the account of the second face-to-face encounter in
March, 1949. Stalin approached the subject of religion by asking if Hoxha ate pork, and he
took Hoxha's positive reply to mean that he had left his Muslim roots far behind (Hoxha,
1979: 121 f). Hoxha then laid out his plan for the handling of religion in Albania, and Stalin
gave his approval (Hoxha, 1979: 122, 156f). Just how much this approval meant to Hoxha
became evident in subsequent years in his single-minded pursuit of a Stalinist society.
Grief-stricken by Stalin's death in 1953, Hoxha signed an oath on behalf of the Albanian
people "to guard the teachings and instructions of Stalin as the apple of its eye, as a historic
behest, and [to] carry them all out consistently" (Hoxha, 1979: 220).
Hoxha's dogged persistence in this policy despite the rest of the world becomes clear in
his 1980 book Eurocommunist is Anticommunism (Hoxha, 1980).

Here Hoxha took the

position that all of the world's communist parties had-betrayed- Stalin and had thus in effect
repudiated Lenin and Marx as well. Unlike these "revisionist traitors," the Albanian Party
of Labor alone remained faithful to Stalin. And its destiny, Hoxha is convinced will be to
lead the ultimate and inevitable triumph of Stalinist Marxism throughout the world.
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There is no doubt that the literature of the Party reflected Hoxha's views as accurately
as his own writings.

As an example we can take a 1983 article in the Albanian journal

Studime Historike (Beqja and Rama, 1983). The goal of education, the authors state, is to
transform human consciousness by eliminating the religious "mildew of the old world" and
thus to produce an authentically atheist society (Beqja and Rama, 1983: 42). But this will not
be a simply matter. What is required is a "merciless, life-and-death struggle" against religion
(Beqja and Rama, 1983: 41) .

The result will be the world's first religionless society,

something "never before seen in the history of humanity" (Beqja and Rama, 1983: 42). For
the sake of the progress of the human species, the radically secular society would be
pioneered in Albania, if necessary by force.
With this glimpse into the mind of Enver Hoxha as background, we can now turn to a
crucial element in his policy, the elimination of outside influence.
Isolation

Without cutting itself off from the international community, it is doubtful that Albania
co�ld have advanced as far as it did towards its goal. To understand this, some historical
background is helpful.
It was only at the beginning of this century that the national consciousness and language
of Albanians began to assert itself. This, combined with the disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire, led to independence in 1912. What preceded was centuries of servitude to foreign
powers.

It is a telling fact that even in the nineteenth century, the only languages of

instruction in Albanian schools were Arabic, Greek, and Italian (Polio and Puto, 1981). Even
after independence, Albania constantly fell victim to Italian, Greek, and Serbian intrigue.
The brutal Zog, proclaiming himself king in 1929, openly allied himself with Italy. In 1939
Mussolini's troops overran Albania, and in 1943 Hitler's troops took over the fascist
occupation of the country.

Thus a long history of constant and unrelenting foreign

domination left a deep imprint on the national memory. It inspired the nationalist resistance
of Hoxha's partisans, and after liberation in 1944 it became a potent contributor to Albania's
isolationist policy.
The fear and hatred of foreign domination in the Albanian national consciousness is
inextricably tied to religion. At the time of liberation, it was commonly held that 70% of the
population was Muslim, 20% Orthodox, and 10% Roman Catholic.

But none of these

religions were native to Albania. Turkish invasions had brought Islam. It was under Greek
domination that Orthodoxy entered Albania.
introduction of Roman Catholicism.

And Italian aggression had included the

Thus all these religions were associated with the

interference of outsiders. Albanians had throughout their history accepted the religions of
the oppressors: sometimes this had been expedient, sometimes necessary for survival. But
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almost always it had been half-hearted.

None of these religions ever really became an

integral part of the Albanian national character.

Already in the nineteenth century, the

proto-nationalists' slogan had been "The religion of the Albanian people is Albania" (Prifti,
1975: 397).

No wonder then that xenophobia and hatred of religion here went hand-in

hand.
Thus cutting ties with the "imperialist West" meant that already in 1945 the state
demanded that all Catholic connections with the Vatican be broken, the Apostolic Delegate
was sent back to Rome, foreign priests were expelled, etc. (Sinishta, 1976: 9). It meant that
when Tito's "revisionism" in Yugoslavia became clear in 1948, he was denounced and
diplomatic relations were broken off. As for the Soviet Union, relations became increasingly
strained after 1953, as Soviet leaders distanced themselves from Stalin's legacy. They were
finally broken off entirely in 1960.

By this time Albania had achieved almost complete

political and cultural isolation. Only a very few outsiders were allowed to visit Albania, and
then under tightly controlled conditions. Realizing however that such total isolation had its
drawbacks, Albanian leaders gradually began to develop relations with China. And when the
Cultural Revolution took hold there in 1966, the alliance was cemented. China thus became
for a time the eager but remote guarantor of Albanian sovereignty and almost its sole trading
partner.
Attempts by foreigners to break Albania's cultural isolation met with furious response.
In 1983, for instance, the Pope had stood on the shores of the Adriatic near Bari and
denounced "atheistic Albania", adding that "Albania is in my heart."

Hoxha's party

newspaper, Zeri i Popullit, fired back, castigating "Pope Vaytila" for his blind anti
communism, and reminding him that every foreign oppressor including Mussolini had said,
"Albania is in my heart" ((Zeri i Popullit, 1983). Religion had always been the weapon of the
occupying enemy.
There were other attempts. Vatican Radio beamed an occasional mass into the country.
Protestant fundamentalists set up loudspeakers along the Greek border in an absurd attempt
to shout religion into Albania.

Others wrapped Bibles together with candy in plastic

containers and floated them down rivers from the north into the country. Of course, the
effect of all such attempts was minimal. For all practical purposes, Albania had made itself
into a hermetically sealed laboratory, shutting out external cultural and religious influence.
It was by far the most isolated society in Eastern Europe and remained so until 1991. Here
was a necessary condition if the goal, the death of religion, was to be reached.
Religious Repression

Repressive measures against religious practice in post-war Eastern Europe varied in their
degrees of severity, as is well known.

In some countries they were mild to non-existent
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while in others they were draconian. In Albania they were the harshest of all, perhaps the
most extreme in the world.
The anti-religious efforts of communist Albania have been documented elsewhere at
great length (Sinishta, 1976; Prifti, 1975; Minnesota Lawyers, 19�9; Gardin, 1988; Puebla
Institute, 1989; etc.). Here only a brief overview can be given. The struggle against religion
began almost immediately after liberation. In 1945 much of the church-owned property in
the country was confiscated by the government (Minnesota Lawyers, 1989: 6). It was a sign
of what was to come.

And yet the new constitution of 1946, like the Yugoslavian

constitution of that year, guaranteed equality to people of all faith (Article 15), and granted
"freedom of opinion and belier• (Article 18) (Minnesota Lawyers, 1987: 5). Moreover, three
Muslims were allowed to take their seats in the People's Assembly of 1945 (Minnesota
Lawyers, 1987: 4). But even these positive signs could not hide the Party's real intentions.
.
For at the same time clergy were being expelled, imprisoned and even executed. But the end
of 1946, it is estimated, half of all Catholic clergy were in prison, and some twenty had been
shot or tortured to death (Sinishta, 1976: 8). Most were accused of having collaborated with
the enemy during the fascist occupation, and some were accused of fomenting subversive
movements. In some cases, the charges were substantially true (Prifti, 1975: 392), while in
others they were clearly fabricated.

The ideological campaign against religion which

followed left little doubt about the Party's goal. And in 1949 the general direction became
unmistakable: all penalties for those who violated the constitutional right to religious freedom
were removed from the penal code (Minnesota Lawyers, 1987: 7).
By 1950 the three religions of Albania were only shadows of their former selves. From
then until l 966 there was continual ideological pressure, the occasional arrest, and harassment
of clergy, all of which gradually weakened these religious institutions further. A network
of prison camps and forced labor camps was developed around the country: Sac, Ballsh,
Burrel, Tirana, Tarovic, Bulquize, Maliq, Kaveje, Kucove, Fier--an Albanian gulag for
criminals, dissidents, and there is no doubt, believers who resisted the Party policy.
But even this, in historical retrospect, looks like a mere holding action in comparison
with the full frontal assault that was to begin in 1966. It was a movement which observers,
regardless of their political or religious views, have called "unprecedented in history" (Polio
and Puto, 1981: 280f). Inspired by China's Cultural Revolution, the Party met in its Fifth
Congress in 1966 and issued an urgent call for completing the construction of socialism in
Albania. This meant above all the final annihilation of religion (Polio and Puto, 1981: 276ff).
Popular and spontaneous anti-religious agitation grew, and this was legitimized when Hoxha,
on 27 February 1976, made public a text entitled "On the Struggle Against Religion, and
Religious Conceptions and Customs" (Minnesota Lawyers, 1989: 7). Houses of worship were
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now closed; public beatings of clergy were common, and the forty remaining Orthodox
priests in the country were publicly denounced and humiliated.
In April of 1967 the campaign was advanced on the legal front. Government Decree No.
4236 mandated the expropriation of all properties used for religious purposes. By September
all churches monasteries, mosques, etc., had been closed (Minnesota Lawyers, 1989: 9). In
November, Decree No. 4337 announced that from now on religion would have no legal status
whatsoever.

At the same time Radio Tirana triumphantly proclaimed Albania the "first

atheist state in the world" (Minnesota Lawyers, 1989: 10). All vestiges of religion, humanity's
great scourge, were to be swept away: religious personal names were to be changed; religious
symbols to be removed from cemeteries; linguistic allusions to religious were to be dropped;
a new calendar replaced religious holidays with Builders' Day, Miners' Day, Printers' Day,
etc. (Minnesota Lawyers, 1989: 9; Prifti, 1975: 401). The radically secular state had made its
debut on the world-historical stage!
This final attempt to crush religion was accompanied by an unprecedented mobilization
of ideological weapons. The masses had to be convinced of religion's disastrous impact on
society. The titles that now poured forth from Tirana's publishers indicate the scope of the
assault: "The People and Religion"; "Medicine and Religion"; "Darwinism and Religion"; "The
Miracles of Religion"; "The Harm of Religious Rites and Festivals"; "On the Origin of
Religion"; "The Reactionary Core of Islam"; "The Priest, the Goat and God"; "Religion
Stripped Naked"; "We Accuse Religion"; etc. (Prifti, 1975: 401). The list could be extended,
but the point of this literature is already clear. Religion is the enemy of humanity and the
source of al misery.
In the years following, people who publicly expressed their religious beliefs were
imprisoned and sometimes executed. To mention just one group, by 1971 there were only
fourteen Catholic priests left in the country, and of these, twelve were in prison and two
were in hiding (Minnesota Lawyers, 1989: 10). There is documented evidence that in 1972
a priest was executed for baptizing a child (Sinishta, 1976: 15).
From a legal point of view, the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom was still on
the books. This was remedied in the new constitution of 1976.

Article 55 now made all

religious activity illegal:
The creation of any type of an organization of a fascist, anti-democratic, religious,
or anti-socialist character is forbidden. Fascist, religious, warmongering, anti
socialist activity and propaganda are forbidden, as is the incitement to hatred between
peoples and races. (Quoted in Minnesota Lawyers, 1989: 11).
A year later the penal code laid out the penalties: three to ten years for possession of religious
literature, for example, and death if such offenses are deemed to be "serious" (Minnesota
Lawyers, 1989: II).
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The period of terror for religious believers, with its imprisonments and executions, did
not end with the death of Enver Hoxha in 1985. His successor, Ramiz Alia, while perhaps
more pragmatic than Hoxha, kept up the pressure on religion (Pipa, 1989). Thus, in 1988 for
instance, a man received five years for wearing a cross and another received ten years for
possession of a Bible (Minnesota Lawyers, 1989: 15f). Only in 1990, after public unrest and
student riots over deteriorating economic conditions, did Alia lift the legal ban on all
relig ious practice, on May 9. Albania's concerted attempt to erase religious sentiment from
human consciousness was over.
What remains is the question of how successful the experiment was. Unfortunately, there
are no scientific data available. But it seems safe to say that by 1990 religion in this country
had been devastated. Signs of this were everywhere at the time. When the first public mass
was celebrated on November 4, 1990, the crowd of five thousand that showed up included
many elderly Catholics, few of whom could remember this central rite of the church. It also
included substantial numbers of Muslims, apparently unaware of the differences between
Islam and Christianity. Here then was sing of the campaign's success: few retained religious
feelings, and of those that did, most had forgotten almost everything. The forty-four year
absence of religion had left this country a religious wasteland.
In November of 1994 I visited this country to assess the situation and to look for sign that
religion was making a comeback. Still, there were no scientific data, no sociological surveys,
etc.

All I was left with were the impressions and opinions of the experts I talked to

(principally Professors Adem Mezini and Gezim Hadaj of Tirana University). They agreed
that two generations of Albanians have grown up in a religious vacuum and therefore interest
in religion today is minuscule. Western Christian fundamentalist reports of a "deep hunger
for religion" in Albania are wild exaggerations. True, churches and mosques are being re
opened (mainly with foreign funds) but many of them stand empty. For the vast majority,
religion is a curiosity of the past which is utterly irrelevant to their current struggles.
The partial exception to this may be the northern city of Shkodra, traditionally the
Catholic center of the country. Here some Catholics now attend mass regularly, but most
under the age of fifty have only the vaguest idea of basic Christian beliefs. Then too, it
must be remembered that traditionally the population is 10% Catholic. Today perhaps half
of those practice their faith.

Far fewer from Muslim or Orthodox backgrounds practice

theirs. If this is substantially correct, it means that only a small fragment of the population
has retained any religious sensibilities whatsoever.
Will religion make a comeback?
Albania

hope

so

(Jehovah's

The many foreign missionaries who now flood into

Witnesses,

Mormons,

Danish

Pentecostals,

American

fundamentalists, etc.). But again, the experts are skeptical. A few of the curious come to
Bible study meetings, for instance, but their numbers are insignificant. A major evangelistic
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rally in Tirana, with all the hype of Disneyworld, attracted a very thin crowd. The Pope
himself, on his 1994 visit to Tirana, drew at most 1000 people. All these are signs that no
vigorous re-birth of religion seems to be taking place here.

Theoretical Questions

If we can legitimately speak of "the religionless society" in the Western world of late
modernity, we will not go far wrong in holding forth Albania as its prime exemplar, even
in the absence of hard data. For religiologists, this case is of particular interest because it
prompts us to reconsider some of the fundamental assumptions of the discipline and to re
open some basic theoretical questions. Here I can only briefly suggest what some of those
questions are.
First, are human beings naturally or innately religious? If we grant that Albania is now
a religionless society, and if religion does not make a comeback here, we may have to
conclude that religion is solely a social construct, handed on from �:me generation to the next
in a complex process of socialization.

Though this has gone on for eons, disrupting the

process of transmission for a mere two generations effectively eliminates it.

From this

perspective, religion is far from being one of the permanent elements in "human nature," but
rather a very fragile and quite dispensable component of human consciousness.
Second, a whole complex of questions arises when we compare the case of Albania with
other Western countries put forth as "religionless societies."

What do Albania, Iceland,

Slovenia, and the Netherlands have in common, if anything?

Neither economic nor

educational levels seems to be relevant factors: the extremely low rates of religious
participation are roughly the same in the richest and the poorest, the most educated and the
least educated. Such comparisons also re-open the much-discussed issue of whether Eastern
European "real socialism" was more corrosive for religion than Western capitalism. Did not
the most militantly anti-religious Marxist regimes (such as Albania) end up more or less
exactly where pro-religious, non-Marxist systems (such as Iceland or the Netherlands) did,
with the religionless society?
Third, from its inception as a discipline, the sociology of religion has in almost every case
sought to understand levels of religiosity in terms of secularization theory. In a word, this
theory holds that as societies become more educated, scientifically oriented, technologically
competent, economically affluent, etc., they become more "secularized", i.e. "religious
institutions, actions, and consciousness [lose] their social significance" (Wilson, 1982: 149).
Hence the advance of modernity dooms religion to eventual extinction. The great anomaly
which now tempts religiologists to abandon this theory is, of course, the United States where
religious participation is today higher than ever.
problems for secularization theorists.

The case of Albania may present new

According to this theory, religion should make a
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comeback in Albania, since it was more or less eliminated by force, and this society remains
relatively undeveloped in education, technology, scientific thinking, etc.

But it may not

make a comeback and there is little evidence after five years that it will. Hence the case of
_Albania may be a new challenge to secularization theory.
Fourth, the main theoretical perspective now vying to replace secularization theory
encounters similar difficulties when confronted with the case of Albania. This is what is
known as "supply-side theory" (Stark and Iannaccone, 1994).

It focuses on "religious

economies" understood as systems consisting of a market of religious customers, religious
firms serving that market, and the different religious products being offered by those firms.
Low levels of religious practice, according to this theory, do not reflect weak demand.
Rather they reflect "an unattractive product, badly marketed, within a highly regulated
religious economy" (Stark and Iannaccone, 1994: 232). The more competitive and pluralistic
the religious economy is, the greater the level of participation will be. While this theory
makes better sense of the American situation than secularization theory, it falters in the cases
of Poland and Ireland.

But what about the case of Albania?

Supply-side theory would

assume that while demand remained constant, the "suppliers" were eliminated, and hence
religious practice declined. But with the return of an abundance of suppliers since 1990 and
free market competition, this theory predicts, religious participation should recover. And
this is precisely what is unclear, even five years later.
The final question to be raised here lies beneath all the others and indeed beneath all
discussion of the "religionless society." It is the fundamental question of the definition of
religion. Religion can, of course, be defined in terms of participation in a certain institution,
or as adherence to a set of beliefs, or as specific acts such as prayer or church attendance.
Using a definition of this type makes it possible to speak of a "religionless society." But it
may be that religion should be defined more broadly, as that which concerns the depth
dimension of human existence, as ultimate concern, as the search for meaning a values, as
the longing for ultimacy and direction in our lives.

If religion is understood along these

lines, it moves beyond the reach of social scientific methodology, and all talk of a
"religionless society" becomes problematic. For surely, whether in Albania, the United States,
or Croatia, this kind of human quest is universal.
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